THE STRUCTURAL QUESTION
Who is institutionally responsible for making public power answerable to the public?
Oversight exists throughout American government. The proposal asks a narrower question: should public accountability itself be the central constitutional mission of an institution, rather than a function distributed among institutions built primarily for other purposes?
NOT A CLAIM OF FAILURE
Existing institutions do real oversight work.
Congress investigates in aid of legislation. Inspectors General audit and investigate within the federal oversight system. GAO provides independent, nonpartisan audit, evaluation, investigative and legal work for Congress. Courts adjudicate disputes and protect legal rights. Prosecutors enforce criminal law. FOIA creates a public right of access to many federal agency records, subject to statutory exemptions.
Accountability functions are dispersed among institutions whose primary constitutional missions are legislation, execution, adjudication or criminal enforcement. The Citizen Branch proposal asks whether a durable public-accountability counterweight should have its own mandate, governance and limits.
THE ANTI-SUPREMACY RULE
A new branch must solve a problem without swallowing the government.
The proposed branch gains no general authority to govern simply because it is empowered to investigate government.
Illuminate power; do not replace it. The branch may trace and explain public power, but it does not become a superior source of policy.
Investigate; do not self-prosecute. CIB may investigate wrongdoing and refer evidence, but it may not prosecute, sentence, or command executive operations.
Compel only through law. Compulsory evidence powers require defined jurisdiction, legal predicates, challenge rights, documentation and judicially enforceable limits.
Protect democratic disagreement. The branch may expose corruption or capture; it may not police ordinary ideological, religious or political disagreement.